Introduction
Much attention has recently been paid, by popular media and serious scholars alike, to the intriguing problem of how to prosecute modern-day pirates. Despite the enthusiasm (at least from some quarters) for trying pirates in international or internationalized courts, however, the prosecution of pirates by national courts exercising universal jurisdiction remains the most efficient, and currently the most practical, solution.
1 If the burden of prosecution is to fall on domestic courts, it is important that those courts apply the relevant international law correctly and consistently This has not been the case so far. Now that the first set of modern-day piracy prosecutions have concluded, judges in national courts should pause to assess how their peers in other jurisdictions have analysed similar legal questions. Applying lessons learned to future cases will help resolve criticisms that domestic courts lack the experience and expertise to handle these cases, 2 and that differences in the domestic application of international law will lead to unfairly disparate treatment of piracy defendants. 3 This article aims to further that process of reflection and consolidation by evaluating five piracy decisions issued in 2010 by courts in Kenya, the Netherlands, the Seychelles and the United States. In doing so, it attempts to answer clearly the recurrent questions of international law that arise in domestic piracy prosecutions regarding the scope of universal jurisdiction over piracy, the elements and customary status of the international crime of piracy, and whether that crime is defined with adequate specificity to satisfy the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege).
The article addresses these questions from the perspective of international law. It does not attempt to dictate how domestic courts should apply international law within the context of their national legal systems, a process of incorporation that may depend on domestic statutes or implicate fundamental constitutional principles. Given the margin of appreciation states have in choosing how to implement international law within their national systems, 4 some differences in the domestic application of the international law of piracy will inevitably remain. This article is concerned about minimizing those differences by ensuring that domestic courts start from a correct understanding of international law before applying it within the bounds of their legal systems.
Similarly, this article is concerned with piracy solely as an international crime. As the subsequent discussion will clarify, states may outlaw additional conduct as 'piracy', but only under their domestic law and subject to their domestic jurisdiction. 5 This domestic crime of piracy is often termed 'municipal piracy' or, more confusingly, 'armed robbery at sea' 6 to differentiate it from the international crime under discussion here. In this article, 'piracy' will refer solely to the international crime over which domestic courts may exercise universal jurisdiction.
Before analysing the contours of that international crime, we start with a brief description of the 2010 piracy decisions.
In a decision issued on 26 July 2010, the court dismissed the terrorism charges but found all the defendants guilty either of piracy (on the basis of joint criminal liability) or of aiding and abetting piracy. Although the Seychelles has since updated its piracy statute, the law then in force incorporated the English law of piracy as of 1976, when the Seychelles attained independence. The court determined that the crime of piracy jure gentium as of 1976 included attempts to rob or seize a ship, as well as attacks on ships that did not result in any harm or injury. Thus, it was no defence that the attack on the Topaz had been quickly repelled: the methods and means of attack nonetheless indicated that the defendants' intent was piratical. The court sentenced all 11 defendants to 10 years in prison. The Somali defendants in both Hasan and Said (like those in Dahir) were apprehended, on 1 April 2010 and 10 April 2010, respectively, after they allegedly fired on United States naval ships but before any attempt to board and rob the targeted ships could have been made. In both cases, the defendants moved to dismiss the charge of piracy because the indictments only alleged they had committed acts of violence, not acts of robbery.
The United States piracy statute (18 U.S.C. § 1651) outlaws 'the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, 1 3 leaving the United States courts to determine the elements of the crime of piracy by reference to customary international law. In so determining, the Said and Hasan courts reached opposite conclusions.
1 4 In a decision issued on 17 August 2010, the Said court determined that an act of violence alone could not constitute piracy and dismissed the count. On 29 October 2010, the Hasan court determined that such conduct could constitute piracy under section 1651. The defendants were subsequently convicted by a jury and sentenced by the court to life in prison. On 3 March 2009, nine armed men allegedly attacked the MV Courier in the Gulf of Aden. They were intercepted by the Germany Navy, with air support from the US Navy, and transferred to Kenya 10 days later for trial. Kenya, which had no other jurisdictional nexus to the crime, agreed to prosecute the alleged pirates through the exercise of universal jurisdiction. The suspects were tried before a magistrate court under Kenya's piracy statute then in force, section 69 of the Penal Code, which provided that 'any person who in territorial waters or upon the high seas, commits any act of piracy jure gentium is guilty of the offence of Piracy'.'
18 After the close of the prosecution case, the defendants sought an Order of Prohibition from the High Court to halt the trial for lack of jurisdiction. The defendants argued that, because the prosecution had clearly established that the incident took place outside of Kenyan territory and that no Kenyan citizens or goods were involved, the magistrate court lacked jurisdiction to proceed with the case.
The High Court agreed with the defendants in a decision dated 9 November 2010. The court based its ruling primarily on section 5 of Kenya's Penal Code, which provides that '[t]he jurisdiction of the Courts of Kenya for the purpose of this Code extends to every place within Kenya, including territorial waters'. This general grant, the court concluded, prevented the magistrate courts from exercising jurisdiction over piracy in international waters. As an overarching provision, section 5 overrode any jurisdictional implications one might draw from the references to 'piracy jure gentium' and 'the high seas' in section 69 of the same Code. 19 This holding conflicted with the earlier decision of the High Court in Ahmed v. Republic, which had held that section 69 empowered all but the lowest magistrate courts of Kenya to exercise universal jurisdiction over piracy jure gentium. 20 During the Hashi trial, section 69 was repealed by the Merchant Shipping Act of 2009, which incorporated the definition of piracy in Article 101 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 21 The High Court determined that the old and new statute covered substantively different crimes; as a result, the new statute, with its presumably clearer grant of universal jurisdic-22 tion, could not be applied to save the prosecution. The judge therefore granted the Order of Prohibition and further ordered the immediate release of the defendants. The Kenyan government appealed the decision, and the Court of Appeals has now recommended that a special bench of five judges be empanelled to resolve the conflicting piracy decisions. 23 The different outcomes of these cases reflect in part variations in national legal systems. But they also reflect some misapprehensions about the content and application of international law. The following sections further explore the reasoning of the courts in light of three recurrent themes: jurisdiction, elements of the offence and due process.
Universal Jurisdiction
It is beyond debate that the international crime of piracy is subject to universal jurisdiction. 24 State practice suggests that there are, however, three basic requirements that must be satisfied before domestic courts may exercise universal jurisdiction: the domestic law must grant the court universal jurisdiction over piracy, the court must have custody of the defendant and the exercise of universal jurisdiction must be limited to conduct that falls within the definition of the international crime of piracy.
A. Domestic Grants ofJurisdiction over the Crime of Piracy
Domestic courts derive their jurisdiction from domestic law. 25 Thus, while international law permits the exercise of universal jurisdiction over piracy, it is up to states to decide whether or not (and to what extent) its courts may use that power. 26 Given the long-standing and well-established existence of universal jurisdiction over piracy, courts may presume that lawmakers wrote domestic piracy statutes with awareness of that jurisdictional right. For this reason, even if a piracy statute only refers in general terms to 'piracy under the law of nations' or 'piracy on the high seas', a court might nonetheless discern a legislative intent to exert universal jurisdiction over piracy to the full extent permissible under international law.
This appears to have been the argument of the public prosecutor in Hashi. On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.
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Although Article 105 does introduce some ambiguity, it primarily serves to delimit the scope of enforcement jurisdiction, or the right of a state to visit and search any ship on the high seas suspected of piracy. 36 For several reasons, it should not be read as precluding the exercise of universal judicial jurisdiction by states other than the capturing state, at least as long as the prosecuting state has physical custody of the defendants. 37 First, Article 105 cannot be read as granting exclusive jurisdiction to the seizing state. To do so would ignore the rights of states with nationality, passive personality, or flag-state jurisdiction over the pirate attack, as well as the jurisdictional provisions of other treaties, like the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), 38 that may apply to the same conduct. Similarly, there is no reason to presume Article 105 excludes the exercise of universal jurisdiction allowed under pre-existing customary international law. 34 Second, the permissive language of Article 105 (that the 'courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed') suggests that provision does not displace other grounds for exercising jurisdiction, but only provides the capturing state with a clear right to exercise jurisdiction if it so chooses. The use of the permissive 'may' in Article 105 contrasts with the overarching directive of Article 100 that '[a]ll States shall cooperate' to repress piracy -a directive that would also be undermined if Article 105 were read as restricting the exercise of universal jurisdiction to just the seizing state. 39 Third, the 'drafting history' of Article 105 does not reflect an intention to limit universal jurisdiction over piracy. Article 105 is derived from Article 15 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas (High Seas Convention), 0 which in turn reflected the efforts of the International Law Commission (ILC) to codify the customary international law of the sea. In its 1956 report to the UN General Assembly regarding draft articles for the High Seas Convention, the ILC explained that the text of Article 15 'gives any State the right to seize pirate ships (and ships seized by pirates) and to have them adjudicated upon by its courts. This right cannot be exercised at a place under the jurisdiction of another State'.' Some scholars have pointed to this statement as evidence that the capturing state cannot transfer a suspect to a third state to be prosecuted,4 2 but the comment only references a restriction on where a state can exercise the described right, not which states may do so. That is, the ILC comment makes the uncontroversial point that a state has no right to seize a pirate or to exercise its own adjudicatory powers within the territory of another state."
In preparing the 1958 High Seas Convention, the ILC relied heavily on a draft piracy convention compiled by legal scholars in the 1930s under the auspices of the Harvard research group (the Harvard Draft).44 Drawing from state practice and scholarly writings, the Harvard Draft concluded that '[a] state which has lawful custody of a person suspected of piracy may prosecute and punish that person '.4 5 Similarly, in the draft convention on jurisdiction under international law prepared as part of the same project, the Harvard research group concluded that states may exercise universal jurisdiction over piracy, with'the competence to prosecute and punish founded simply upon a lawful custody of the person charged with the offense'."
6 That the relevant jurisdictional fact is 47 In sum, universal jurisdiction over piracy is of the more narrow forum deprehensionis variety that requires physical custody of the accused 48 -but it matters not how that custody was attained.
Historically and for practical reasons, the state that seized pirates on the high seas was typically the sole custodial state, as the captain of the seizing ship would try and execute the captured pirates before returning to land. There was thus no need to distinguish between the state of seizure and the state of custody The concept of transferring captured pirates to third states for prosecution did not receive close attention until the modern era, when technology combined with heightened concerns for due process made full judicial proceedings on land both feasible and requisite. 50 Thus one purpose of Article 105's language ('[t]he courts of the state which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalty to be imposed') may be to clarify that the seizing state must prosecute the detained persons, if it chooses to do so, in a court of law.
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The more likely purpose of the Article 105 language, however, is to clarify that the capturing state has a prerogative to prosecute the suspected pirates, an interpretation that matches current state practice. 52 It is, for example, the approach taken by the Djibouti Code of Conduct, an agreement among the that a ship having seized pirates could bring them'into the port of some country [not necessarily its own] to be judged by a competent tribunal'. League of Nations, Committee of Experts on the Progressive Codification of International Law 'Piracy, 20 AJIL. Special Supplement (1926) 222-229, at 225 (emphasis added) (hereafter 'League of Nations'). Although the Committee also proposed that '[j]urisdiction in piracy belongs to the State of the ship making the capture, ibid., at 229, in context this provision appears to protect the prerogative of the seizing state to prosecute, with room for other states to assert jurisdiction (including universal jurisdiction) if the seizing state declines to exercise that prerogative. See e.g. ibid., at 225-226: 'The State which seizes the pirate vessel and arrests the crew is the obvious judge of the validity of the capture and the guilt of the parties concerned. It should by preference be accorded the right to investigate and to pass judgment in the case....' (emphasis added). 55 Of course, the right to exercise universal jurisdiction is separate from the legal process of transferring custody between states, an issue that has led to transfer agreements between states patrolling the Gulf of Aden, such as the United States and the UK, and coastal states willing to prosecute pirates, like Kenya and the Seychelles.
5 6 These transfer agreements nonetheless reflect an assumption that the receiving state has the legal right to exercise universal jurisdiction over pirates in its custody whom it did not itself capture. It must be anticipated that some suspects transferred in this manner to Kenya or other third states will raise Article 105 as a defence. The reasoning of the Rotterdam court in The 'Cygnus' Case provides a useful model for analyzing such arguments.
5 8 That court first determined that the Dutch Criminal Code explicitly grants universal jurisdiction over the crime of piracy and then considered whether this domestic grant conflicts with UNCLOS or the SUA Convention. It acknowledged the 'seizing state' language of Article 105 of UNCLOS but concluded that the language did not, either explicitly or implicitly, vest exclusive jurisdiction in the seizing state (Denmark) so as to preclude the exercise of universal jurisdiction by another country (the Netherlands). While the court acknowledged that the Netherlands had a traditional interest in the prosecution because the victim ship was registered in the Netherlands Antilles, it took care to emphasize that such considerations were relevant only to the question of the expediency of exercising jurisdiction, not to the fact of jurisdiction itself. Generalizing from the approach of The 'Cygnus' Case, a court might analyse a defence based on Article 105 by first identifying the scope of jurisdiction under domestic law (which, it has been argued here, should be interpreted in light of the legislature's presumed awareness of universal jurisdiction over piracy jure gentium). If the court has jurisdiction as a matter of national law, it might then note that Article 105 does not preclude prosecution by a state other than the capturing state, while customary international law affirmatively allows for it. Finally, the court might evaluate whether other factors, particularly requests by other states to prosecute the defendants, nonetheless bear on the choice to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case.
C. Limits of Universal Jurisdiction
There are, however, important limits to the exercise of universal jurisdiction over piracy.
As the US court in Hasan correctly emphasized,'a state's ability to invoke universal jurisdiction is inextricably intertwined with, and thus limited by, the substantive elements of the crime as defined by the consensus of the international community'. 59 That is, a domestic court may only exercise universal jurisdiction over conduct falling within the crime of piracy as defined by international law.
6 0 Indeed, the very point of defining the crime of piracy under international law is, in many respects, to define and therefore circumscribe the extent to which states may exercise universal jurisdiction over the citizens and ships of other countries. 6 ' It must be remembered that, in the context of piracy, the reach of universal judicial jurisdiction goes hand-in-hand with the right to exercise universal enforcement jurisdiction -a power of much greater concern to flag states and which has been carefully restricted under both customary and treaty law.
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Thus courts must be careful to distinguish clearly between the crime of piracy proper and that of 'municipal piracy', over which universal jurisdiction does not extend. We turn, then, to consider the content of the crime of piracy under customary international law. 
The International Crime of Piracy
From the perspective of international law, the crime of piracy is authoritatively defined by Article 101 of UNCLOS: Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
a. any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.
b. any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; c. any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
This Part clarifies the elements of this definition before building the case that Article 101 represents customary international law. It concludes with a brief consideration of the problem of intertemporal law when states incorporate customary international law into domestic law by general reference.
A. Elements of the Crime of Piracy
The crime prohibited by Article 101(a) consists of five elements:
(1) any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation; (2) committed for private ends; (3) on the high seas or a place outside the jurisdiction of any state; (4) by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft; and (5) (if at sea) directed against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft.
The first element makes clear that piracy is not co-extensive with 'armed robbery at sea': what is required is either 'illegal acts of violence or detention' or 'any act of depredation'. Even before the codification of Article 101, the customary international law of piracy no longer required an intent to rob (animus furandi). 63 But if there is an intent to rob, it may be that no violence is necessary for the conduct to be considered piratical. 63 See e.g. ILC Report, supra note 41, at 282 (Acts of piracy may be prompted by feelings of hatred or revenge, and not merely by the desire for gain.'); League of Nations, supra note 46, at 224, 228; Harvard Draft (Piracy), supra note 26, at 786-787: Oppenheim, supra note 34, at 752. 64 This at least was the conclusion of the Harvard Draft. Harvard Draft (Piracy), supra note 26, at 786.'Depredation'as a legal term, however, arguably connotes violent conduct (plunder, pillage).
The third element, that piracy jure gentium must occur outside the sovereign territory of any state, is a critical component of the definition as it excludes territorial waters from the reach of universal jurisdiction.
6 5 Under UNCLOS, territorial waters extend up to 12 nautical miles from the state's shoreline. 66 While UNCLOS also allows states to claim limited sovereign interests in an additional 200-nautical mile stretch of water, this 'exclusive economic zone' (EEZ) counts as international waters for the purposes of Article 101.67 Thus, for example, the Seychelles court in Dahir correctly concluded that individuals could be guilty of piracy proper (rather than municipal piracy) for conduct that occurred within the country's EEZ. 68 The second, fourth and fifth elements have together elicited the most debate. By their terms, they exclude from the definition of piracy mutinies, hijackings and official state acts. Such acts may nonetheless give rise to the state responsibility 6 9 or be governed by treaties like the SUA Convention and its many Protocols, 70 The Seychelles court in Dahir rejected the conflation of these criminal categories, reasoning that the requirement that piracy be committed for 'private ends' conflicts with the politically motivated nature of terrorism. 72 The court chastised the prosecution for pursuing piracy and terrorism charges for the same criminal conduct instead of charging them in the alternative. 73 The Dahir court was wise to distinguish clearly between terrorism and piracy, two labels that are used loosely in common rhetoric but which should be restricted in a criminal context to their more precise legal definitions. 74 on the high seas is piracy It is true that terrorism under international law requires an intent to coerce a government authority or to terrorize a population, which typically implies a political or ideological motivation.
7 7 While many assume (like the Dahir court) that the 'private ends' requirement therefore excludes all terrorist acts from the ambit of piracy, 78 this conclusion might be too hasty. 79 The commentary to the Harvard Draft suggests the 'private ends' requirement was originally intended to exclude from the definition of piracy only the acts of belligerents and rebels who do not have the standing of states under international law, but who nonetheless operate within the context of the laws of war or of state responsibility and whose acts might therefore be considered 'public'. 0 Under this perspective, the opposite of 'private' would not be 'political' but 'public'.
Terrorists might act with a proclaimed political motivation, but they are not typically public actors in this sense. This was the reasoning of the Belgian Court of Cassation in Castle John v. NV Mabeco, which found that members of the environmental group Greenpeace engaged in piracy when they boarded, occupied and caused damage to other vessels on the high seas that were discharging polluting waste. 8 1 The defendants' motivation, according to the court, was a personal point of view, even though it related to a political issue; because the acts were not committed in the interest or to the detriment of a state, they were properly characterized as 'private'. 82 This understanding of 'private ends' as the inverse of 'public ends' (and not 'political ends') would prevent perpetrators from avoiding liability by constructing political justifications for their piratical conduct.
8 3 It would also allow the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction over pirate ships believed to be preparing terrorist acts, particularly when the suspected pirate-terrorist ship is operating, not under the jurisdiction of any flag-state, but in a state of anarchy.
Still, the anti-terrorism regime has now developed sufficiently that there is no need to stretch the anti-piracy regime to cover terrorist acts -and there may be some real costs to doing so. 84 When new threats emerge, existing legal notions may be broadly interpreted to avoid lacunae, but such stop-gap measures can in the long run have unintended consequences. With the wide adoption of the SUA Convention (and the development of several Protocols to cover additional emerging threats), prosecutors and courts have a better-tailored regime for addressing the problem of maritime terrorism. While there is a legitimate argument that some acts of terrorism could constitute piracy, the Dahir court was correct in spirit: courts should avoid relying on the law of piracy to sanction politically motivated violence unless absolutely necessary -and only if all the other elements of Article 101 have been met.
B. Article 101 as Customary International Law
State practice and opinio juris uniformly make clear that Article 101 of UNCLOS reflects the current customary international law of piracy. The definition was adopted almost word-for-word from Article 15 of the High Seas Convention, itself a codification of existing customary international law. 85 Between the states parties to the High Seas Convention and to UNCLOS, 168 countries have bound themselves to this definition, including 138 of the 150 countries with 81 77 ILR 537 (1986). 82 Ibid., at 539-540. 83 See e.g. Mensah, supra note 76, at 165. 84 Cf. Collins and Hassan, supra note 3, at 100 ('To expand piracy to include terrorist acts would undermine the anti piracy regime, since the strategies to combat each crime are poles apart.'); Tuerk,'The Resurgence of Piracy, supra note 74, at 32 (expressing concern about the conflation of piracy's universal jurisdiction and the SUA Convention's more narrow prosecute-or-extradite regime). maritime borders. 86 And of the 162 countries that have ratified or acceded to UNCLOS, none have made any declaration or reservation regarding the piracy provisions. 87 While the United States, a major maritime country, has not yet ratified UNCLOS, it has nonetheless consistently affirmed that the Convention's piracy provisions represent binding customary international law. 88 Meanwhile, the states most affected by modern-day piracy in Southeast Asia and around the Horn of Africa have adopted additional anti-piracy cooperation agreements that incorporate the Article 101 definition.
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At the international level, the UN Security Council in unanimous resolutions has repeatedly reaffirmed that Article 101 'sets out the legal framework applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea'. 90 The IMO has similarly invoked Article 101 as the definitive statement of the crime of piracy, 91 and other UN agencies have reiterated the definition's customary status. 92 The customary status of Article 101 is further supported by major treatises and the consensus of the scholarly community 9 3 While some would extend the definition to encompass additional acts, there is no significant dispute that Article 101 embodies the core of the crime which all agree should be universally condemned. 9 Thus, Article 101 sets the minimum extent to which national courts can apply universal jurisdiction.
Despite this strong evidence that Article 101 represents customary international law, two US trial courts -sitting in the same district, considering similar facts, and ruling within months of each other -nonetheless reached opposite conclusions as to the clarity and content of the customary law of piracy. While the analysis employed by the Hasan court demonstrates an accurate understanding of the nature and sources of international law, the analysis conducted by the Said court suggests instead a misapprehension of how customary international law is formed and from what sources it can most accurately be gleaned.
To identify the customary international law of piracy, the Hasan court correctly considered 'the works of jurists, writing professedly on public laws;... the general usage and practice of nations; [and] judicial decisions recognising and enforcing that law'.
5 Focusing on state practice, the court noted UNCLOS's wide ratification, including by countries like Somalia most affected by modern-day piracy, and it acknowledged that a treaty ratified by an 'overwhelming majority' of states is evidence of customary international law, at least when states consistently act in conformity with the treaty provisions.
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It also considered significant piracy decisions from the US, British and Kenyan courts. 97 Finally, in collecting scholarly writings, the court correctly clarified that academic debates over some aspects of the definition of piracy do not detract from the consensus that Article 101 represents the core of the customary international law of piracy. Applying the Article 101 definition of piracy, the Hasan court determined that the alleged acts of violence, regardless of animusfurandi, could constitute 'piracy' under 18 U.S.C. § 1651.
Unlike the Hasan court, the Said court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 1651 as limited to acts of armed robbery on the high seas, based primarily on a US Supreme Court decision from 1820, United States v. Smith. 99 As a result, it dismissed a piracy charge because the defendants did not board or rob the targeted ship. 101 Nonetheless, the court held that it could not apply the Article 101 definition of piracy because the clarity of that customary norm was fatally undermined by some doubts raised by seven commentators. 102 This conclusion was flawed.
First, as the Said court itself recognized,os what matters most in the determination of customary international law is state practice. As described above, Third, to the extent courts do rely on scholarly writings as a subsidiary means for determining the content of international law, 106 the writers should be 'the most highly qualified publicisists of the various nations', 107 those 'who by years of labor, research, and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat'. 108 The seven commentators relied upon by the Said court do not seem collectively to satisfy this standard. Two of the writers appear to agree that Article 101 of UNCLOS is the authoritative definition of piracy,1 09 while another has subsequently explicitly rejected the Said court's holding.1 10 Of the remaining four, one was a student,"' one was a non-academic practitionerll2 and one was quoting a treatise from 1830 in passing while discussing an entirely different topic." 3 The remaining admittedly significant work relied upon by the court was written more than 20 years ago;" 4 for perspective, during the intervening decades more than 100 additional states have ratified or acceded to UNCLOS.11 5 Even taken together, these criticisms of the Article 101 definition do not undermine the clear scholarly consensus that Article 101 represents customary international law.
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The Said court also emphasized that the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), an organ of the International Chamber of Commerce, uses a different definition from Article 101 when tracking incidents of piracy worldwide.
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But the IMB definition is not intended to have any legally enforceable import.
1 18 The IMB tracks piracy for commercial purposes, to determine the financial impact of sea-based violence on the global shipping industry. Its definition is designed to encompass all violent attacks on ships, including those that occur in territorial waters (and therefore are not acts of piracy, in the international sense discussed here). How the IMB defines piracy for a statistical purpose is irrelevant to the identification of a unitary definition of piracy under customary international law.
The Said court overlooked the overwhelming consensus as to the customary status of Article 101 because it focused on sources that do not directly bear on the formation and content of customary international law. The Hasan court better applied the process for identifying customary international law, and as a result it reached the correct conclusion that Article 101 reflects customary international law, based on state practice (both usus and opinio juris) and reinforced by a clear consensus among scholars of international law.
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C. Intertemporality and the Domestic Incorporation of Customary International Law
Underlying the difference in the analysis conducted by the Hasan and Said courts may be a more fundamental disagreement: whether a domestic statute incorporating the law of nations by reference should be interpreted on the basis of customary international law as it exists today or as it existed at the time of the statute's adoption. Hasan court). 120 The Said court did not explicitly limit itself to the latter view, but it emphasized that a statute must be interpreted 'by its ordinary meaning at the time of its enactment' and it suggested that recognizing the evolution of the customary international law incorporated in the piracy statute would render that statute unconstitutionally vague, thereby violating due process. 757 F. Supp. 2d at 559, 566. This latter line of argument is taken up below, in Part 5.
law of nations should be construed according to contemporary international law. 125 This discussion casts some doubt on the Hashi Court's conclusion that Kenya's repealed statute, which outlawed 'piracy jure gentium', related to a substantively different crime from that of the new law, which incorporates Article 101 of UNCLOS.1 26 The court did not clarify its reasoning, which might have been based on two different premises: that the crime of piracy under current customary international law differs from the definition found in Article 101, or that the old piracy statute -despite its general reference to the law of nations -statically incorporated customary law as of the time of its adoption. As the discussion here illustrates, both of these premises are vulnerable to challenge.
Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Requirement of Adequate Specificity
For states that do incorporate customary international law through general reference in domestic statutes (automatic ad hoc incorporation), the issue of intertemporal law leads directly to the principle of legality: how can a law that flexibly adapts to an external and, in the case of customary international law, largely unwritten set of laws be adequately specific so as to accord with modern notions of due process?
The requirement of specificity (nullum crimen sine lege stricta) is a subset of the overarching principle of legality: the idea that no one should be held criminally responsible for conduct that was not legally prohibited at the time of its commission (nullum crimen sine lege). From the defendant's perspective, the requirement of specificity ensures fair notice of potential liability, which in turn protects individuals from arbitrary government behaviour.1 27 To satisfy this requirement under international law, a criminal prohibition must be foreseeable, which means it must also be accessible.1 28 Customary international law -whether codified in treaties or unwrittencan satisfy the principle of legality.1 29 Unwritten customary international law may be difficult for individuals to ascertain; nevertheless, to rise to the level of customary law, a norm must be so widely accepted and so consistently expressed that it will perforce be both foreseeable and accessible.1 30 It must be borne in mind that 'accessible', in the context of nullum crimen, has a broad meaning and may require an individual to discern the law by drawing from multiple sources. Just as an individual may be expected to know how local courts have previously interpreted and applied domestic criminal prohibitions, so an individual can be expected to know the content of customary international law when it is consistently stated in the declarations of states, judicial decisions and respected treatises.131
Courts will still need to analyse, under the rubric of their respective legal systems, whether a principle of unwritten customary international law is adequately foreseeable and accessible in the circumstances. 132 Particularly at the margins, unwritten customary international law may raise significant nullum crimen concerns.'
33 But the task is made much easier when, as with piracy, the customary norms have been codified in widely adopted treaties. Indeed, the definition of piracy has been explicitly and stably codified for more than 50 years, first in the High Seas Convention and now in UNCLOS.
It thus should not offend the principle of legality for domestic statutes, like that of the United States, to criminalize piracy by reference to customary international law without further specifying the elements of the crime. The difference in approach taken by the US courts in Hasan and Said on this point is again instructive. The Said court worried that recognizing the evolution of customary international norms incorporated within domestic law would render 18 U.S.C. § 1651 unconstitutionally vague, as 'defendants in United States courts would be required to constantly guess whether their conduct is proscribed' 3 4 The Said court ignored the fact that the definition of piracy is much more settled today (under Article 101) than it was in 1820, when the US Supreme Court in Smith resorted to diverse writings on international law to define piracy under the law of nations. 135 Yet even in that situation, the 
